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Whenever someone makes a copy of a copyrighted work, that copy is either authorized 
by the copyright owner, permitted by some express provision of the copyright statute 
(such as the ephemeral copy provision in section 112 or the fair use provision in section 
107), or infringing. That's what we tell our colleagues and what we teach our students. 
But most of us don't actually believe it, and this article argues that that understanding of 
the copyright law is wrong.  
 
I make this argument by examining the copyright law through the lens of personal use. 
Unlike many other jurisdictions, the United States has not troubled itself to nail down the 
lawfulness of personal copying and other personal uses. The statute prohibits infringement 
actions “based on the noncommercial use by a consumer” of “a digital audio recording 
device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog 
recording medium,” but is otherwise silent on the topic of personal uses. We have been 
comfortable with considerable uncertainty about the scope of lawful personal use because 
enforcing copyrights against personal uses seemed, until recently, unthinkable.  
 
Two related developments have spurred a reexamination of the lawfulness of personal 
uses. First, in the last three years, record labels and motion picture studios have sued 
thousands of individuals for copyright infringement. Second, the Supreme Court in the 
Grokster case adopted a standard for contributory copyright liability for distributors of 
technology that turns on whether the uses that the distributors encouraged their customers 
to engage in are lawful or unlawful.  
 
In this article, I argue that people's reading, listening, viewing, watching, playing and 
using copyrighted works is at the core of the copyright system. I revisit copyright cases 
that have attracted criticism for their stingy construction of copyright owners' property 
rights, and suggest that the narrow reading of copyright rights was motivated, at least in 
part, by courts' solicitude for the interests of readers and listeners. I then articulate a 
definition of personal use. Armed with that definition, I look at the range of personal uses 
that are uncontroversially non-infringing under current law. I focus in particular on 
personal uses that seem to fall within the literal terms of copyright owners' exclusive 
rights, and seem to be excused by no statutory limitation, but which are nonetheless 
generally considered to be lawful. I proceed to offer an alternative test for assessing the 
lawfulness of personal uses. Finally, I return to the conventional paradigm of copyright 
statutory interpretation, under which all unlicensed uses are infringing unless excused. I 
suggest that that rubric is not only inaccurate, but potentially destructive of copyright's 
historic liberties.  
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“We are perfectly fine with personal use. ” 
 
--Mitch Bainwol, Recording Industry Association of America (2005)1 
    
 
Despite its having sued more than 18,000 of its customers,2 the recording 
industry wants the world to know that it has no complaint with personal use.  
Copyright lawyers of all stripes agree that copyright includes a free zone in which 
individuals may make personal use of copyrighted works without legal liability.3  
Unlike other nations, though, the United States hasn’t drawn the borders of its lawful 
personal use zone by statute.4  Determining the circumstances under which personal 
use of copyrighted works will be deemed lawful is essentially a matter of inference 
and analogy, and differently striped copyright lawyers will differ vehemently on 
whether a particular personal use is lawful or infringing.5 
                                                
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.  An unusually large number of people have helped me 
come to grips with this topic.  I owe particular thanks to Jon Weinberg, Graeme Dinwoodie, Nina 
Mendelson, Jonathan Cohen and Pamela Samuelson, whose questions caused  me to rethink 
crucial questions and come up with different answers. 
1 Future of Music Coalition 5th Annual Policy Summit, Sept 12, 2005, at 10:53 a.m. (audio 
recording on file with author), podcast online at URL: < 
http://www.futureofmusic.org/events/summit05/panel04.cfm >. 
2 See Jefferson Graham, RIAA Chief Says Illegal Song-Sharing “Contained,” USA Today, June 
12, 2006, online at URL: http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/services/2006-06-12-riaa_x.htm. 
 
3 Professor Marci Hamilton coined the phrase “free use zone” to describe these uses.  See Marci 
A. Hamilton, Impact of The Trips Agreement on Specific Disciplines: Copyrightable Literary And 
Artistic Works: Article: The Trips Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 613 (1996). 
4 Contrast, e.g., Canada; Norway.  See, e.g., BMG Canada v. Doe [2004] F.C. 88 (Can.);  Tarja 
Koskinen-Olsson, The Notion of Private Copying in Nordic Legislation in the Light of European 
Developments in Recent Years, 49 J. Copr. Soc’y 1003 (2002). 
5 Compare, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 
283, 300(1996) (“courts have generally declined to find personal copying as infringing”) with Jane 
C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in 
U.S. Copyright Law, 51 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 113 (2003)(“U.S. and international copyright law 
have increasingly recognized that the author’s right to authorize, or at least be compensated for, 
the making of copies, extends…to end users who make individual copies for private 
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The dispute is not simply a question of where one lives on the copyright food 
chain. The contours of lawful personal use are fuzzy as well as contested.6  Every 
time a study of copyright law queries the scope of lawful personal use, it concludes 
that the answer to the question whether any particular personal use is lawful is 
indeterminate.7  Wherever the fuzzy borders of lawful personal use lie, however, most 
would agree that the lawful personal use zone is shrinking.  
 
Congress has significantly expanded the breadth of copyright protection in the 
past few decades; some of that expansion has come at the expense of personal use.8   
The proliferation of digital technology has made personal use both easier to track, 
trace and charge for,9 and a more formidable threat to conventional commercial 
exploitation of copyrights.10  Copyright owners have therefore launched a variety of 
initiatives to replace unmetered and unmonitored personal uses with licensed ones.  
They have demanded the restraint of unauthorized personal use as a necessary step in 
encouraging the new commercial services to flourish.11  Meanwhile, individuals’ 
claims to make personal copies and pass them on to friends and family seem more 
                                                                                                                                
consumption”). See also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 129 (2000): 
Perhaps the most contentious current copyright issue 
concerns the legality of private, noncommercial copying. … The 
extremes of the positions on this issue are well established and 
heavily subscribed to. Some rights holders seem to believe that all, 
or nearly all, unauthorized reproduction of their works, whether 
private or public, commercial or noncommercial, is an 
infringement. Many members of the general public appear to believe 
that all or virtually all private, noncommercial copying of 
copyrighted works is lawful. 
 
6 See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment L.J. 337, 338-50 (2002). 
7 See Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, study number 14, at 12, 2 Arthur Fisher 
Memorial Edition at 790; Borge Varmer, Photoduplication by Libraries, Study # 15, at 51, 2 
Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition at 817, Digital Dilemma, supra note 5, at 129-36. OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYING: TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES THE 
LAW 5-14 (1989). 
8 E.g., Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727; Computer Software 
Rental Amendments Act of 1990, title VIII of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-650, 104 Stat 5089, 5134; No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 
2678 (1997); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887 
(1998). 
9 See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy v. Piracy, 9 Int’l J. Comm. L. & Policy 7 (2004-05); Jessica 
Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image, 22 Dayton L. Rev. 587, 602-13 
(1997). 
10 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of 
an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. Copyright Soc’y of the USA 113 (2003).  
11 See, e.g., American Library Association v. F.C.C., 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
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questionable when those copies are digital.12 Copyright owners have insisted, with 
some success, that digital devices must be equipped with copy-prevention technology 
before being made available to consumers.13   Increasingly, what consumers have 
viewed as a “right” to make fair uses of copyrighted works is painted as a historically 
and technologically contingent privilege that may need to yield to copyright owners’ 
new licensing strategies.14  
 
Fifty years ago, copyright law rarely concerned itself with uses that were not 
both commercial and public.15  Twenty years ago, when the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Sony v. Universal Studios16 was still fresh, people believed they were free to use 
copyrighted works non-commercially, and the law for the most part backed that belief 
up.17  Today, however, the recording industry has sued more than 18,000 individuals 
for making personal uses that can be characterized as “commercial” only by 
redefining commercial to mean “unlicensed.”  Today, trading music with your friends 
is called “piracy” and collecting photocopied articles relevant to your job is stealing.  
Today, it’s a big deal when the lawyer representing the recording industry concedes 
to the Supreme Court that it is lawful for 22 million iPod owners to use them to listen 
to music they’ve copied from purchased recordings.18 
 
Whether the shrinking of lawful personal use should disturb us depends on 
whether personal use has intrinsic value.  If personal use was once lawful solely 
because of enforcement difficulties, the easy enforcement of copyright prerogatives 
against individuals for unlicensed personal uses is yet another benefit of technological 
                                                
12 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283, 300-
01 (1996); The Digital Dilemma, supra note 5, at 126-45.  
13 See, e.g., Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436-44 (2d ir. 2001).  See also Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, Endangered Gizmos, at URL:  http://www.eff.org/endangered/ (visited Aug. 
25, 2006). 
14 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, supra note 5, at __; Jane C. Ginsburg, "the Exclusive Right to Their 
Writings": Copyright and Control in the Digital Age, 54 Me L. Rev. 495 (2002); See also In re 
Public Hearing on Intellectual Property Issues Involved in the National Information Infrastructure 
(Nov. 18, 1993) at __ (remarks of Bruce A. Lehman, Chairman, Working Group on intellectual 
Property) (suggesting that fair use may be unnecessary in an electronic environment). 
  
15 See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 
(1994); Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J. 
Intell. Prop. L. 319 (2003). 
16 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
17 See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970-71 (1992); H.R. 
Rep. No. 873, part 1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); Joel L. McKuin, Home Audio Taping Of 
Copyrighted Works And The Audio Home Recording Act Of 1992: A Critical Analysis, 16 
Hastings Comm/Ent 311 (1994). 
 
18 See Transcript of Oral Argument, MGM v. Grokster, No. 04-480, March 29, 2005, URL: 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-480.pdf at 11-12. 
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progress.  If the only factors discouraging us from welcoming the reduction in the 
scope of lawful personal use are concerns for the collateral damage to our privacy 
arising from vigorous enforcement of copyright within the home, or the effects of 
reduced access on social equality, we could address those fears directly by legislating 
new privacy rights or encouraging the adoption of innovative pricing models.   
 
If those suggestions fail to quell the queasiness you feel at the idea that fewer 
and fewer personal uses remain lawful, then perhaps we’ve overlooked some role that 
personal use plays in the copyright system.  Missing such a thing would certainly be 
understandable.  We tend not to talk much about personal use when we’re considering 
copyright reform.19  Personal users have historically found fervent advocates in 
copyright law discussions only when they’re employing consumer electronic devices, 
and only from the manufacturers of those devices.20  Although copyright scholarship 
has wrestled with the lawfulness of personal uses since Universal Studios sued to 
enjoin the Sony Betamax,21 we’ve had some difficulty coming up with useful 
formulations.   As copyright law has expanded to encompass more and more territory, 
our vocabulary to describe the remainder has seemed to shrink as well.   
 
Particular scholars have sought to infuse the debate with a more nuanced 
analysis. Professors Julie Cohen,22 Yochai Benkler,23 Rebecca Tushnet,24 and Neil 
Netanel,25 among others, have attempted to derive legal principles that protect the 
interests of those who experience rather than create copyrighted works from the first 
amendment.26 Professor L. Ray Patterson, among others, found users’ rights in the 
                                                
19 See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Ore. L. Rev. 275, 
348-53(1989). 
20 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); see Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony 
v. Universal:  The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens  
21 See, e.g., Wendy Jane Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 COLUM. L. REV. __ (1982); L. 
Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1 (1987) 
22 Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in 
Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981 (1996); Julie E Cohen. Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self 
Help, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1089, 1123 (1998). 
23 Yochai Benkler, The Public Domain: Through The Looking Glass: Alice And The Constitutional 
Foundations Of The Public Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Prob. 173(2003); Yochai Benkler, From 
Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons 
and User Access, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561(2000); Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common 
Use:  First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 
(1999). 
24 Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay:  How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How 
Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004). 
25 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright in a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L. J. 283 (1996) 
26 See also, e.g.,  C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891 
(2002); Malla Pollack, The Democratic Public Domain:  Reconnecting the First Amendment and 
the Original Progress Clause (a.k.a. the Copyright and Patent Clause), 4 Jurimetrics 23 (2004); 
Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom of Imagination:  Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1 (2002); 
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copyright and patent clause of the constitution.27 Professors Joseph Liu and Glynn 
Lunney, among others, have  suggested that we find a theoretical basis for protecting 
consumers within the four corners of copyright law itself.28  Both Cohen and Liu have 
criticized as reductionist the common depictions of users in the copyright literature, 
and have sought to refine our understanding of how the interests of users and 
consumers have been under-appreciated in current copyright law and copyright legal 
scholarship.29  
 
 In the summer of 2005, the unanimous Supreme Court decision in MGM v. 
Grokster caused the unsettled issue of personal use to assume increased importance.30 
The decision drew a line between the distributors of technology that makes 
infringement easier who would be liable for their customers’ infringing use, and the 
distributors of like technology who would not.31  The difference, the Court held, lay 
in whether the distributors had promoted infringing  or non-infringing use.  To assess 
likely contributory liability we need to know what personal uses are infringing.  That 
question is more pressing because the recording and motion picture industries, which  
initially painted their suits against individuals as a last resort given the lower court 
rulings in Grokster’s favor,32 have apparently found the practice of suing hundreds of 
peer-to-peer file sharers each month too delicious a habit to break.  The suits generate 
a few thousand dollars each and may have some deterrent value.  The economics of 
defending them make it unlikely that individual defendants will choose to litigate.33  
We therefore face the prospect that thousands of consumers will pay stiff peer-to-peer 
taxes to the recording and motion picture industry each year without a meaningful 
chance to establish whether they are doing something illegal.34 Nor should we feel 
confident that the assault on personal use will stop at peer-to-peer file sharing.  Flush 
                                                                                                                                
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There A Right To Have Something To Say? One View Of The 
Public Domain, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 297 (2004). 
27 L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example Of The Law Of Unintended Consequences, 8 J. 
Intell. Prop. L. 223 (2001); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1 (1987). See also Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites To Filesharing: Personal Use In 
Cyberspace, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1129, 1134 (2001)(arguing that the policies underlying the copyright 
and patent clause support the enactment of a personal use privilege). 
28 See Joseph Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 Boston College Law Review 397 
(2003); Glynn Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisted, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975 
(2002). 
29 See Liu, supra note 28;  Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. 
Rev. 347 (2005). 
30 MGM v. Grokster, __ U.S. __ (2005).  See Jonathan Band, So What Does Inducement Mean?, 
Computer & Internet Lawyer (November 2005)  
31 __ US at __. 
32 See Pornography, Technology and Process:  Problems and Solutions on Peer to Peer Networks, 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (Sept. 9, 2003). 
33 See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 Case Western L. Rev. 917 (2005) 
34 See Brief of Amici Curiae Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., and Other Law Professors in Support of 
Respondents, MGM v. Grokster, No, 04-480. 
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from its victory over Grokster, the recording industry changed its tune and explained 
that the copyright piracy threat posed by P2P file sharing was insignificant compared 
with the threat posed by unauthorized CD burning, and that the industry was rolling 
out copy-protected CDs to meet the threat.35  Meanwhile, both the motion picture 
industry and the recording industry seek law requiring consumer electronics 
companies to incorporate copy prevention technology into digital televisions and 
radios.36 Thus, the effort to capture control over personal uses is moving further and 
further into consumers’ homes.37   
 
 This paper seeks to refocus the discussion of users’ and consumers’ rights 
under copyright, by placing people who make personal use of copyright works at the 
center of the copyright system.  The view of copyright that such a reconfiguration 
permits yields some useful insights.  It allows us to look at 19th and 20th Century 
copyright cases in a new light:  Rather than viewing those opinions  as decisions by 
common law judges construing statutes stingily,38 we can appreciate them as 
interpretations informed by a view of copyright in which readers and listeners are as 
important as authors and publishers.   
 
 I propose in this paper to look at the place of readers, listeners, viewers and 
the general public in copyright through the lens of personal use.  After Grokster, the 
topic of personal use is timely, indeed critically so.   Limiting myself to personal use, 
moreover, allows me to evade, for now, many of the interesting questions that arise 
when readers, listeners, users and experiencers morph into publishers and 
distributors.39 Finally, personal use is a realm where even the most rapacious 
copyright owners have always agreed that there are some uses are lawful even 
thought they are neither exempted or privileged in the copyright statute nor 
recognized as legal by any judicial decision.40  
                                                
35 See Mitch Bainwol, Building a Brighter Future:  Making and Selling Great Music, National 
Association of Recording Merchandisers Convention, Aug. 12 2005, at URL: 
http://www.narm.com/2005Convention/Bainwol.pdf. 
36 See ALA v. FCC, 406 F3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Broadcast and Audio Flag:  Hearing Before 
the Senate Commerce committee, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 24, 2006), at URL: 
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/witnesslist.cfm?id=1704; EFF, Broadcast Flag, 
http://www.eff.org/broadcastflag/ (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
37 See generally The Audio and Video Flags:  Can Content Protection and Technological 
Innoivation Coexit?  Hearing Before the House Commerce Committee, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Jun 
27, 2006), at URL: 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/06272006hearing1960/hearing.htm; The Analog 
Hole:  Can Congress Protect Copyright and Promote Innovation, Hearing Before the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 21, 2006), at URL: 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1956. 
38 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 980 (1990). 
39 For some of my insights on those questions, see Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 37 
Hastings Comm/Ent 1 (2004). 
40 See Marci Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement:  Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 613 (1996); infra text accompanying note 99 - 122. 
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In part II of this paper, I urge that people’s reading, listening, viewing, 
watching, playing and using copyrighted works is at the core of the copyright system.  
In part III, I revisit copyright cases that have attracted criticism for their stingy 
construction of copyright owners’ property rights, and suggest that the narrow reading 
of copyright rights was motivated, at least in part, by courts’ solicitude for the 
interests of readers and listeners. These courts sought to evaluate whether accused 
uses were more akin to reading and listing than to publishing and distributing, and 
they examined the potential impact of their decisions on readers and listeners as welll 
as authors and publishers.  When a broad literal reading of statutory language would 
have significantly burdened  reading, listening and viewing, these courts resisted that 
interpretation of the statute.  In part IV, I articulate a definition of personal use.  
Armed with that definition, in part V, I look at the range of personal uses that are 
uncontroversially non-infringing under current law.  I focus in particular on personal 
uses that seem to fall within the literal terms of copyright owners’ exclusive rights, 
and seem to be excused by no statutory limitation, but which are nonetheless 
generally considered to be lawful. I proceed in section VI to offer an alternative test 
for assessing the lawfulness of personal uses.  Finally, in section VII, I return to the 
conventional paradigm of copyright statutory interpretation, under which all 
unlicensed uses are infringing unless excused.  I suggest that that rubric is not only 
inaccurate, but potentially destructive of copyright’s historic liberties. 
 
  
II. What is copyright law for? 
 
The copyright law … makes reward to the owner a 
secondary consideration. 
 --United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948 ) 
 
We sometimes talk and write about copyright law as if encouraging the creation 
and dissemination of works of authorship were the ultimate goal, with nothing further 
required to “promote the Progress of Science.”41   We have focused so narrowly on 
the production half of the copyright equation that we have seemed to think that the 
“Progress of Science” is nothing more than a giant warehouse filled with works of 
authorship.  When we do this, we miss or forget an essential step.  In order for the 
creation and dissemination of a work of authorship to mean anything at all, someone 
needs to read the book, view the art, hear the music, watch the film, listen to the CD, 
run the computer program, build and inhabit the architecture.   
 
 This insight seems so obvious that it is surprising that it shows up so rarely in 
the copyright laws, the legislative efforts to enact them, or the scholarship that 
critiques them.  The copyright interests of the readers, viewers, listeners, watchers, 
builders and inhabitants may get short shrift in Congressional hearings because they 
have so few paid representatives beyond members of Congress themselves.  Their 
                                                
41 Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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absence until very recently from copyright scholarship is more difficult to account 
for.  The notion that copyright law’s primary purpose is to benefit the public has been 
commonplace for many years.42  The understanding that its mechanism was to enable 
works of authorship to enrich the people who read, listened to, and viewed them has 
appeared in many copyright cases.43  Yet copyright scholarship’s recent 
preoccupation with law and economics has translated those pronouncements into 
assertions that the public will benefit when authors and distributors have robust 
incentives to create and market works.44  So long as people buy books and CDs, who 
cares if they read or listen to them? Outlier scholars have published books and articles 
seeking to argue that copyright law, properly understood, places readers, listeners and 
viewers at its center.45 Those arguments, though, have for the most part been poorly 
received even by copyright skeptics, who have viewed them as extreme.46 
 
Copyright law is intended to create a legal ecology that encourages the creation 
and dissemination of works of authorship, and thereby “promote the Progress of 
Science.”  As James Boyle has reminded us, ecologies are complex and 
interdependent systems.47 If we build shopping centers and housing tracts on all of the 
marshes and frog ponds, we will eventually find ourselves overrun with mosquitoes.  
In the same way, laws that discourage book reading end up being bad for book 
authors.  Thus, it isn’t difficult to frame an argument that copyright law cannot 
properly encourage authors to create new works if it imposes undue burdens on 
readers.  Such arguments are more palatable to fans of strong copyright than 
arguments urging the primacy of reading, and much of the scholarship urging limited 
copyright, my own included,48 has relied on them.49  Those arguments, though, have 
                                                
42 See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 3-9 (1989); ROBERT GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 1 
(1991). 
43 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); USA v. Paramount Pictures, 334 US 131 
(1948). 
44 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 79-80 (2001). 
45 See, e.g.,  L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT:  A LAW 
OF USERS’ RIGHTS (1991); Glynn Lunney, supra note 28; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative 
Destruction of Copyright, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (2002). 
46 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 29, at __. Copyright true believers have been even less receptive.  
For a strident and not entirely coherent argument that users have and should have no rights 
whatsoever under copyright laws, see David R.  Johnstone,  Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copy 
Duty Under US Copyright Law, 52 J. Copyright Soc’y USA 345, 357-58 (2005)(“ No "Users' 
Rights" Exist (Explicitly or Implicitly)”). 
47 James Boyle had the insight that intellectual property laws created an information ecology.  See 
James Boyle, An Environmentalism for the Net, 47 Duke L. Rev. 87 (1997); James Boyle, The 
Second Enclosure Movement, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 33 (2003); Symposium:  Cultural 
Environmentalism @ 10, L. & Contemp. Probs.  (forthcoming 2006). 
48 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 1018-19 (1990). 
49 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S 
PARADOX (forthcoming 2007); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, 66 L. & Contemp. 
Probs. 44-49 (2003). 
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been vulnerable to the assertion that if strong copyright laws prove unfavorable to 
authors because of the burdens they impose on readers, authors can always exercise 
their options to waive some of their rights, or license them on easy and generous 
terms.50  Recent rejoinders have focused on the difficulties attending licensing.51  I 
want to resist the temptation to advance an argument that personal use requires 
protection for the sake of authors.  Rather, I want to insist that copyright law 
encourages authorship at least as much for the benefit of the people who will read, 
view, listen to and experience the works that authors create, as for the advantage of 
those authors and their distributors.   
 
For most of the history of copyright, the law left reading, listening, and viewing 
unconstrained.  The copyright statutes on the books neither mentioned personal uses 
expressly, nor needed to.  The exclusive rights granted by copyright were narrow, and 
the law aimed its proscriptions at commercial and institutional entities.  Thus the 
opportunities of members of the public to engage in unfettered reading, listening to, 
and looking at works protected by copyright received little explicit attention.  They 
nonetheless functioned as historic copyright liberties,52 implicit in the copyright 
statutory scheme and essential to its purpose.  Where copyright claims posed serious 
threats to these liberties, courts often responded by reading the scope of copyright’s 





III. Revisiting older cases 
 
[T]he copyright statute accords the proprietor of a 
copyright a number of exclusive rights.  But unlike 
the patentee, the copyright owner does not enjoy the 
exclusive right to “use ” his copyrighted work. ” 
---Alan Latman, 195553 
 
 
U.S. copyright law initially limited itself to securing the author’s right to 
“print, reprint, publish or vend.”54  In 1856, Congress added a public performance 
right, limited to dramatic compositions. In 1870, it added dramatization and 
                                                
50 See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 Nova S.E.Univ. L. Rev. 
657, 697 (1999). 
51 See Lessig, supra note 49, at __; Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 
53 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. 673 (2003); Katie Dean, Copyright Reform to Free Orphans, 
WIRED News, April 12, 2005. 
52 See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, 
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stanford L. Rev. 1343 (1989). 
53 Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, study number 14, at 5, 2 Arthur Fisher Memorial Edition at 
783. 
54 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
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translation rights.  In 1897, it extended the public performance right to musical 
compositions. The standard account of 19th and early 20th century copyright in the 
United States tells us that Congress defined the scope of the copyright grant 
narrowly and courts construed it stingily.55  Looking back at early copyright law 
from the vantage point of the 21st century, when copyright rights are broad, deep 
and very long,56 the scope of early copyright laws can seem startlingly 
constrained.  Focusing on the relative narrowness of early copyright’s excusive 
rights, though, can obscure some of the reasons informing courts’ interpretations.  
The language of some of the most notorious decisions limiting the scope of 
copyright advanced the interests of readers, listeners and viewers.  Courts 
confronting novel claims of infringement sought to locate the allegedly infringing 
behavior on the continuum between exploitation and enjoyment, in order to 
preserve copyright owners’ control over exploitation while denying them control 
over individual reading, listening, playing and viewing.57  
 
In Stowe v. Thomas,58 for example, Harriet Beecher Stowe sued to enjoin 
the publication of an unauthorized German translation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and 
lost.  The court held that her copyright in the book did not extend so far: 
An author may be said to be the creator or inventor, both 
of the ideas contained in his book, and the combination of words 
to represent them. Before publication he has the exclusive 
possession of his invention. His dominion is perfect. But when 
he has published his book, and given his thoughts, sentiments, 
knowledge or discoveries to the world, he can have no longer an 
exclusive possession of them. Such an appropriation becomes 
impossible, and is inconsistent with the object of publication. 
The author's conceptions have become the common property of 
his readers, who cannot be deprived of the use of them, nor of 
their right to communicate them to another clothed in their own 
language, by lecture or by treatise.59 
 
Eaton Drone’s 1879 copyright treatise described the decision in Stowe v. Thomas 
as “clearly wrong, unjust and absurd,”60 and it has long been traditional to cite the 
                                                
55 See ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVID, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 326-
27 (2000);  Netanel, supra note 49, at __; Edward Samuels, The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in 
Copyright Law, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 321, 325-47 (1989). 
56 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2002). 
57 The late Ray Patterson, in an important article published two decades ago, articulated this 
distinction as the difference between using the copyright and using the work.  See L. Ray 
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 Vanderbilt. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1987). 
58 23 F. Cas. 201 (1853) 
59 Id. at 206 
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case as an example of the extraordinary stinginess of 19th century US copyright.61 
What we miss, though, when we look only at how narrowly the court construed 
the author’s rights,  is its focus on the rights of readers.  The court struck a 
balance between authors’ property interests and readers’ “common property” 
interests, in which the author’s exclusive right yielded to her readers’ right to 
communicate the author’s conception.  The translator and publisher of the 
German edition were, in this analysis, simply readers of Stowe’s book, exercising 
the liberties that copyright law afforded them.  
 
A century later, in a pair of copyright cases challenging cable television 
system’s unlicensed transmission of broadcast signals, the Supreme Court held 
that the cable operators were not performing the signals they transmitted within 
the meaning of the statute, but should be deemed akin to viewers.62  Similarly, 
when composers sued the owner of a small Pittsburgh restaurant who entertained 
his customers by playing radio programs in the dining area, the Court held that the 
restaurant could not be held liable for publicly performing the music for profit.  
What it was doing when it played the radio for its customers, the Court insisted,  
was not performing, but listening.63 The Court predicated its construction of the 
                                                
61 See, e.g., Litman, supra note 38, at 979; Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the Information 
infrastructure:  Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 777, 824 
(2000); Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1213, 1233-34 
(1997). 
62 In Fortnightly v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968),  a motion picture studio that 
had licensed its programming to television for broadcast sued the operator of cable television 
systems that had, without a license, transmitted the programming to customers in nearby areas 
who had poor television reception because of the hilly terrain.  The studio claimed that Fortnightly 
was performing its motion pictures for profit.  The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court 
continued:  
Essentially, a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity to 
receive the broadcaster's signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an 
efficient connection to the viewer's television set.  It is true that a CATV 
system plays an "active" role in making reception possible in a given area, but 
so do ordinary television sets and antennas. CATV equipment is powerful and 
sophisticated, but the basic function the equipment serves is little different from 
that served by the equipment generally furnished by a television viewer.  If an 
individual erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed 
the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be "performing" the 
programs he received on his television set. The result would be no different if 
several people combined to erect a cooperative antenna for the same purpose. 
The only difference in the case of CATV is that the antenna system is erected 
and owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur. 
Id. at 399. Six years later, the Court was invited to reexamine the line between broadcaster and 
viewer in a copyright infringement case against a cable television company that imported 
television broadcast signals from geographically remote areas.  See Teleprompter v. CBS, 415 
U.S. 394 (1974). The Court refused to find copyright liability. 
 
63 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 160-61, 163-64 (1975):  . 
 To hold in this case that the respondent Aiken "performed" the petitioners' 
copyrighted works would … result in a regime of copyright law that would be both 
wholly unenforceable and highly inequitable.  
12
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public performance right in part on its concern for the restaurant owner’s interest 
in listening to the radio.  
 
None of these cases targeted individual personal users directly;64 all were 
suits against intermediaries who facilitated reading, listening and viewing.  The 
courts resolved them in defendants’ favor, though, by treating the intermediaries’ 
activities as on the readers’ listeners’ or viewers’ side of the line between 
copyright owner exploitation and reader, listener or viewer enjoyment of 
copyrighted works.  In other cases, courts explicitly addressed the intermediaries’ 
role, but considered the potential impact of  prohibiting the use on reader, listener 
or viewer liberties as an important and possibly determinative consideration. 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
 The practical unenforceability of a ruling that all of those in Aiken's position are 
copyright infringers is self-evident. One has only to consider the countless business 
establishments in this country with radio or television sets on their premises -- bars, 
beauty shops, cafeterias, car washes, dentists' offices, and drive-ins -- to realize the total 
futility of any evenhanded effort on the part of copyright holders to license even a 
substantial percentage of them.  
 
 And a ruling that a radio listener "performs" every broadcast that he receives would 
be highly inequitable for two distinct reasons. First, a person in Aiken's position would 
have no sure way of protecting himself from liability for copyright infringement except 
by keeping his radio set turned off. For even if he secured a license from ASCAP, he 
would have no way of either foreseeing or controlling the broadcast of compositions 
whose copyright was held by someone else. Secondly, to hold that all in Aiken's position 
"performed" these musical compositions would be to authorize the sale of an untold 
number of licenses for what is basically a single public rendition of a copyrighted work. 
The exaction of such multiple tribute would go far beyond what is required for the 
economic protection of copyright owners, and would be wholly at odds with the balanced 
congressional purpose behind 17 U.S.C. § 1(e): 
 
"The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection 
accorded to music has been to give to the composer an adequate 
return for the value of  his composition, and it has been a serious and 
a difficult task to combine the protection of the composer with the 
protection of the public, and to so frame an act that it would 
accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer an 
adequate return for all use made of his composition and at the same 
time prevent the formation of oppressive  monopolies, which might 
be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for the 
purpose of protecting his interests." H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 
2d Sess. , 7 (1909).  
 
Id. at 163-64. 
 
64 Until the recent flood of peer-to-peer file sharing lawsuits, copyright infringement suits against 
individuals were so rare as to be almost unthinkable.  When Universal Studios included a nominal 
claim against individual Betamax owner William Griffiths in its 1976 lawsuit against Sony,  that 
fact inspired a host of editorial cartoons, despite the fact that Mr. Griffiths was a client of the firm 
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Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States65 has the distinction of having 
been dubbed the “Dred Scott” case of copyright law.66 Williams & Wilkins, a 
publisher of 37 medical journals, sued the National Library of Medicine, claiming 
that photocopying journal articles to meet requests for interlibrary loans infringed 
its copyrights.  The Court of Claims held the photocopying to be fair use. The 
court began its analysis with the observation that the statutory right to “’copy’ is 
not to be taken in its full literal sweep.” 
The court-created doctrine of "fair use" … is alone enough to 
demonstrate that Section 1 does not cover all copying (in the literal 
sense).  Some forms of copying, at the very least of portions of a work, 
are universally deemed immune from liability, although the very words 
are reproduced in more than de minimis quantity.  Furthermore, it is 
almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a handwritten 
copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own use….67 
 
Judge Davis’s opinion relied on “years of accepted practice” of  copying entire 
poems, songs, illustrations, articles, and judicial opinions for personal use to 
support the proposition that copyright law permits unlicensed copying in a host of 
situations,68  and then focused on the burden to individual medical researchers of 
deeming the Library’s copying to be infringing: 
If photocopying were forbidden, the researchers, instead of subscribing 
to more journals or trying to obtain or buy back-issues or reprints 
(usually unavailable), might expend extra time in note-taking or waiting 
their turn for the library's copies of the original issues -- or they might 
very well cut down their reading and do without much of the information 
they now get through NLM's and NIH's copying system.  The record 
shows that each of the individual requesters in this case already 
subscribed, personally, to a number of medical journals, and it is very 
questionable how many more, if any, they would add.  The great 
problems with reprints and back-issues have already been noted.  In the 
absence of photocopying, the financial, timewasting, and other 
difficulties of obtaining the material could well lead, if human 
experience is a guide, to a simple but drastic reduction in the use of the 
many articles (now sought and read) which are not absolutely crucial to 
the individual's work but are merely stimulating or helpful.  The probable 
effect on scientific progress goes without saying….69 
 
                                                
65 487 F.2d 1345 (1973)., aff’d by an equally divided court,  U.S. . 
66 See 487 F. 2d at 1387 (Nichols, J. dissenting) (“We are making the Dred Scott decision of 
copyright law.”); Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, Universal City 
Studios v. Sony, (“Williams & Wilkins Co., which has been appropriately regarded as the "Dred 
Scott decision of copyright law” … is clearly not binding in this circuit, and, in any event, we find 
its underlying rationale singularly unpersuasive.”); rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).. 
67 Id. at 1350. 
68 Id. at 1353. 
69 Id. at 1358. 
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In the aggregate, the Library’s photocopying was massive.  The court nonetheless 
concluded it was non-infringing because of the personal use interests of each of 
the many individual researchers for whom the copies were made. 
 
In Sony v. Universal Studios,70 copyright owners sued the producer of the 
videocassette recorder, claiming that it should be liable for the massive copyright 
infringement of the millions of consumers who used its VCR to record broadcast 
programming off the air.  The Supreme Court held that recording a program to 
enable its later viewing, while technically an unauthorized copy, was fair use and 
therefore not actionable.71 “One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any 
sign that the elected representatives of the millions of people who watch 
television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at 
home…”72 
 
Other opinions famous for their stingy constructions of copyright owners’ 
control also advanced the interests of readers, listeners and viewers.   White Smith 
v. Apollo,73 for example, stands in the copyright lexicon for the illogical 
narrowness of the copyright law of its era.74  In White-Smith, a music publisher 
sued to enjoin the manufacture of piano rolls designed to cause piano rolls to play 
songs protected by the publisher’s copyright.  The Court held that piano rolls were 
not “copies” within the meaning of the statute, and that they therefore did not 
infringe: “When the combination of musical sounds is reproduced to the ear it is 
the original tune as conceived by the author which is heard. These musical tones 
are not a copy which appeals to the eye. In no sense can musical sounds which 
reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies as that term is generally 
understood.”75  The effect of White-Smith was to allow non-musicians who would 
                                                
70 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
71 Id. at  . See Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony, Mary Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in 
JANE C. GINSBURG AND ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 
(2005). 
72 464 U.S. at 456. The interests of television viewer had more influence on the result in Sony than 
the ultimate opinion reveals.  Justice Stevens who authored the majority opinion, focused 
primarily on the rights of homeowners using VCRs from the first Supreme Court deliberations on 
the case.  Indeed,  an early draft of the majority opinion characterized the lawsuit as an effort to 
“control the way William Griffiths watches television…” 
73 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
74 See, e.g., Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters:  The Court, Media Neutrality and New 
Technologies, 12 J. Intell. Prop. L. 427, 427 (2005);Craig Joyce et. al., Copyright Law 70, 76 (6th 
Ed. 2003).  For a different analysis that seeks to rehabilitate the White-Smith v. Apollo opinion, see 
Kenneth M. Alfano, Copyright in Exile:  Restoring the Original Parameters of Exclusive 
Reproduction (manuscript on file with author). 
75 209 U.S. at 17: 
It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument which reproduces 
a tune copies it; but this is a strained and artificial meaning. When the 
combination of musical sounds is reproduced to the ear it is the original tune as 
conceived by the author which is heard. These musical tones are not a copy 
which appeals to the eye. In no sense can musical sounds which reach us 
15
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otherwise have been unable to play the copyrighted songs to enjoy listening to 
them in their homes. 
 
Looked at from the vantage point of a copyright owner seeking 
enforcement of its rights, these opinions have seemed unreasonably conservative, 
and have been criticized accordingly.76  Viewed from the perspective of readers, 
listeners, and viewers, though, the decisions vindicate their continuing importance 
in the copyright formula. Stowe v. Thomas recognized the rights of Stowe’s 
readers; White-Smith v. Apollo and George Aiken advanced the interests of 
listeners; Sony and the cable television cases upheld the rights of viewers. 
Williams & Wilkins suggested that copyright law has always excused strictly 
personal copying.  If copyright law is designed to encourage reading, viewing, 
listening and experiencing works of authorship as well as creating and distributing 
them, then courts’ reluctance to read the copyright grant too expansively can be 
seen as an effort to preserve that equilibrium.77 Cases that are conventionally 
painted as the most notorious examples of courts’ crabbed construction of 
copyright may be more usefully understood as defenses of the central place of 
readers, listeners and players in the copyright scheme.   
 
More recently, some courts have given copyright a similarly constrained 
reading in cases involving computer technology.  In Nintendo of America v. Lewis 
Galoob Toys,78 Nintendo sued the maker of the Game Genie, which allowed 
consumers to modify the way a Nintendo game played.  Nintendo argued that the 
Game Genie caused consumers to create unauthorized derivative works by 
varying the Nintendo games’ audiovisual display. The trial court noted that “The 
alleged infringer in this case is not a commercial licensee, but rather a consumer 
                                                                                                                                
through the sense of hearing be said to be copies as that term is generally 
understood, and as we believe it was intended to be understood in the statutes 
under consideration. A musical composition is an intellectual creation which 
first exists in the mind of the composer; he may play it for the first time upon 
an instrument. It is not susceptible of being copied until it has been put in a 
form which other can see and read. The statute has not provided for the 
protection of the intellectual conception apart from the thing produced, 
however meritorious such conception may be, but has provided for the making 
and filing of a tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which it 
is the purpose of the statute to protect the composer. 
Id. at 17. See also Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (D.C. Ct. App. 1901) (phonograph records 
not “copies”). 
 
76 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, "the Exclusive Right to Their Writings": Copyright and Control in 
the Digital Age, 54 Me. L. Rev. 495 (2002). 
77 To put this another way, courts seem to have interpreted the scope of copyright rights in light of 
a conviction that Congress had carefully weighed the rights of readers and listeners against the 
rights of authors and publishers to arrive at the appropriate, carefully calibrated balance, and that 
Congress did not and would not have abridged the rights of readers and listeners significantly 
without saying so in a clear, ringing voice.   
78 780 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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utilizing the Game Genie for noncommercial, private enjoyment. Such use neither 
generates a fixed transferable copy of the work, nor exhibits or performs the work 
for commercial gain.”  The consumer, the court concluded, did not infringe 
Nintendo’s copyright by using a Game Genie to alter the game play of Nintendo 
games: 
Both parties agree that it is acceptable, under the copyright laws, 
for a noncopyright holder to publish a book of instructions on how to 
modify the rules and/or method of play of a copyrighted game. Once 
having purchased, for example, a copyrighted board game, a consumer is 
free to take the board home and modify the game in any way the 
consumer chooses, whether or not the method used comports with the 
copyright holder's intent. The copyright holder, having received expected 
value, has no further control over the consumer's private enjoyment of 
that game. 
Because of the technology involved, owners of video games are 
less able to experiment with or change the method of play, absent an 
electronic accessory such as the Game Genie. This should not mean that 
holders of copyrighted video games are entitled to broader protections or 
monopoly rights than holders of other types of copyrighted games, 
simply because a more sophisticated technology is involved. Having paid 
Nintendo a fair return, the consumer may experiment with the product 
and create new variations of play, for personal enjoyment, without 
creating a derivative work.79 
It followed that Galoob did not infringe by selling the device that enabled the 
consumers’ use. The Court of Appeals affirmed.80  Neither the trial court nor the 
Court of Appeals were able to ground their interpretation in the literal language of 
section 106(2) of the copyright statute; instead, they gave the language a 
narrowing gloss because they were persuaded of the importance of the 
consumers’ interest in playing games they had purchased in the ways they desired 
to. 
 In Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland International,81 Lotus sued 
Borland for copying the words and arrangement of the menu command hierarchy 
of the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program, which Lotus insisted embodied the 
program’s “look and feel.”  The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded 
that whether or not the menu command hierarchy resulted from expressive 
choices, it was uncopyrightable as a “method of operation” under section 102(b) 
of the copyright statute.82 Judge Boudin, concurring, expressed some discomfort 
                                                
79 780 F. Supp.  at 1291. 
80 954 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
81 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
82 17 U.S.C. § 102(b): 
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the 
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. 
17
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with the majority’s rationale.  In his view, the interests of Lotus’s customers, who 
had invested time learning Lotus’s commands and devising their own macros 
required a judgment for Borland.  The difficulty was finding an appropriate 
rationale to support it: 
If Lotus is granted a monopoly on this pattern, users who have 
learned the command structure of Lotus 1-2-3 or devised their own 
macros are locked into Lotus, just as a typist who has learned the 
QWERTY keyboard would be the captive of anyone who had a 
monopoly on the production of such a keyboard. Apparently, for a period 
Lotus 1-2-3   has had such sway in the market that it has represented the 
de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet commands. So long as Lotus 
is the superior spreadsheet--either in quality or in price--there may be 
nothing wrong with this advantage. 
But if a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see why 
customers who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it 
should remain captives of Lotus because of an investment in learning 
made by the users and not by Lotus. Lotus has already reaped a 
substantial reward for being first; assuming that the Borland program is 
now better, good reasons exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus 
customers: to enable the old customers to take advantage of a new 
advance, and to reward Borland in turn for making a better product. If 
Borland has not made a better product, then customers will remain with 
Lotus anyway. 
Thus, for me the question is not whether Borland should prevail 
but on what basis.83 
 In Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia 
Systems,84 the recording industry brought suit to enjoin the sale of the first 
portable MP3 player under the Audio Home Recording Act.  The recording 
industry argued that, in return for shielding consumers from liability for 
noncommercial copying of recorded music,  the law required digital audio 
recording devices to incorporate copy-protection technology and pay copyright 
royalties to compensate rights holders for the presumed copies made by 
individuals.  Since Diamond neither paid the statutory royalties nor included serial 
copy management technology in the device’s design, the RIAA argued, its 
manufacture and sale of the device was illegal.  The court of appeals for the 9th 
Circuit ruled that portable MP3 players were not subject to the copy-protection 
and royalty payment requirements of the Audio Home Recording Act.  Moreover, 
it continued: 
The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or "space-
shift," those files that already reside on a user's hard drive. …Such 
copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent 
with the purposes of the Act.85 
                                                
83 49 F.2d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring). 
84 189 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979). 
85 Id. at 1072 (citing Sony v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984)). 
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The court’s language reflects a conviction that noncommercial personal use was 
lawful, and that marketing devices that facilitated it, therefore, could not engender 
liability.    
 
The line of authority reading copyright rights narrowly to preserve the 
liberties of readers, listeners or viewers is by no means undisputed.  For every 
case in which a copyright defendant persuaded a court to read statutory exclusive 
rights narrowly, there is at least one in which the court mechanically applied the 
literal language of the statute to find infringement without much attention to the 
effects of the ruling on readers, listeners or viewers.86 In A&M Records v. 
Napster, for example, defendant sought to rely on Sony  and RIAA v. Diamond to 
argue that users of its software engaged in lawful personal copying.87  The Court 
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit found that argument too hard to swallow.  Judge 
Beezer’s opinion rejected Napster’s argument that downloading music from other 
individuals might be excused either by the Audio Home Recording Act or by the 
fair use doctrine.  Indeed, appalled by the vast scale, in the aggregate, of millions 
of individuals’ copying music from each other’s hard drives, Judge Beezer 
declared the consumer copying to be commercial.88  In Grokster, the Supreme 
Court predicated its opinion on the assumption – uncontested by defendants  –  
that the vast majority of consumer file sharing over peer-to-peer networks was 
blatantly illegal.89  Not all courts consider the impact of their rulings on personal 
uses, and not all personal uses strike courts as legitimate.  The strongest inference 
the case law supports is that reader, listener and viewer interests have influenced 
many courts’ reading of the scope of copyright, and that that influence dates back 
to the earliest copyright cases. 
 
At least some courts, then, have long treated reading, listening, viewing 
and using as essential copyright liberties.  When copyright owners’ claims have 
trod on them too heavily, courts have read copyright’s exclusive rights narrowly 
to preserve those liberties from copyright-owner control.  Reading, listening, 
viewing, and their modern cousins watching, playing, running, and building, are 
central to the copyright scheme.  We knew that once, but forgot it sometime 
within the past generation as the rhetoric of copyright increasingly characterized 
personal uses as piracy and theft.  If we think about personal use as a guilty 
pleasure that is probably morally wrong, we’re going to lose it.  If we recall that 
encouraging personal use is an objective that’s crucial to the copyright system, we 
may find the will to defend it against increasingly forceful encroachment. 
                                                
86 See, e.g, MAI v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Red Baron-Franklin Park v. 
Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275(4th Cir.); Worlds of Wonder v. Veritel Learning Systems, 658 F. Supp. 
351 (N.D. Tex. 1986). 
87 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
88 Id. at 1015 (“Direct economic benefit is not required to demonstrate a commercial use. Rather, 
repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered for sale, 
may constitute a commercial use.”). 
89  MGM v. Grokster, __ U.S. at __. 
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IV. What is “personal use?” 
 
“It would plainly be unconstitutional to prohibit a person 
from singing a copyrighted song in the shower or jotting 
down a copyrighted poem he hears on the radio.” 
--Justice John Paul Stevens, 198390 
 
 
In order to sidestep extant debates about what counts as “private use,”  
“noncommercial use,” or “use by a consumer,” in which advocates for various 
results have taken hardened positions,91 I’d like to avoid previously contested 
vocabulary.  I want to start with a definition of “personal use.”  I offer the 
definition on the assumption that some subset of personal use will be lawful, some 
subset will be infringing, and that the legality of some personal uses will be 
controversial.  With that disclaimer, I propose to define “personal use” as a use 
that an individual makes for herself, her family, or her close friends.92  So defined, 
personal use can take place at home or at work, on the street or in the store.  It 
may happen with or without a commercial purpose.  It may or may not compete 
with copyright owners’ planned exploitation of their works.  It may occur within a 
statutory exemption. It may be either permitted or prohibited by a license.  
Figuring out which personal uses are lawful and which are not will give us a 
chance to examine the place of personal use in the copyright scheme.   
 
In the spirit of rhetorical experiment, and as part of my strategy for 
sidestepping existing controversies, I propose to refer to the individuals who make 
                                                
90 1st draft, Memorandum of Justice Stevens, Sony v. Universal Studios (No.81-1687) (circulated 
June 13, 1983),  at 17-18. See Jessica Litman. The Sony Paradox, 55 Case Western L. Rev.  917, 
930-34 (2005). 
91 See Music on the Internet:  Is There an Up Side to Downloading?:  Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. On the Judiciary, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 11, 2000) at URL: 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=195; MusicUnited.org, The Law, URL: 
<http://www.musicunited.org/2_thelaw.html> (visited August 13, 2006); University of Georgia, 
Regents’ Guide to Understanding Copyright and Fair Use, URL: 
http://www.usg.edu/legal/copyright/#part3d3b (visited August 13, 2006); Lutheran-Hymnal.com, 
Permission and Copyright and URL: http://www.lutheran-
hymnal.com/about_us/permision_and_copyright.html (visited August 13, 2006). 
92 For a somewhat broader definition see Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites To Filesharing: 
Personal Use In Cyberspace, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1129, 1134 (2001) (“ ‘Personal use,’ in the broad 
sense, means consumption or adaptation of intellectual properties by individual users for their own 
purposes, including uncompensated sharing of those works with others.”)  For a narrower 
definition see Lutheran Hymnal Online, Permission and Copyright URL: http://www.lutheran-
hymnal.com/about_us/permision_and_copyright.html (visited August 13, 2006) (“Personal private 
use is that which occurs within you [sic] immediate biological family”). 
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personal use as “persons,”  “people,” or “individuals” rather than “consumers,”93 
“users,”94 or “fans.”95  
 
 
V. What personal uses are lawful? 
 
“ anyone may copy copyrighted materials for the 
purpose of private study and review” 
--Saul Cohen, 195596 
 
 
With a definition of personal use to work with, we can start to map out which 
personal uses are lawful and which infringe.  A standard paradigm for construing 
the copyright law holds that any unlicensed use that falls within the literal terms 
of section 106, which gives copyright owners control over fixed reproductions, 
adaptations, distributions to the public, public performance and public displays,97 
violates the copyright law unless it comes within the terms of an express statutory 
exemption.98 As I will explore in detail below, I believe that rubric is at best 
misleading, but it will give us a place to begin.  Even if the standard paradigm 
accurately describes the law, there is a large class of personal uses that are simply 
outside of the scope of the current copyright statute.  That zone, smaller than it 
used to be, includes all private performances and displays.99  It includes all private 
distributions, since the copyright owner’s distribution right is limited to 
distributions “to the public.”100  Copyright owners have no copyright rights that 
would allow them to control private performances, displays and distributions.  
Nor have copyright owners any right to prohibit people from making unfixed 
reproductions of copyrighted works.101  
                                                
93 See, e.g., Liu, supra note 28. 
94 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 29. 
95 See, e.g., Fred Von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers A Good Idea, Law.com (Sept. 29, 
2004), at URL: <http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1095434496352>.  See also Justin 
Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 
923(1999)(“non-owners”). 
96 Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 43, 58 (1955). 
97 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
98 See, e.g., MusicUnited.org, The Law, URL: http://www.musicunited.org/2_thelaw.html (visited 
August 13, 2006); Brad Templeton, 10 Myths About Copyright Explained, URL: 
http://www.templetons.com/brad/copymyths.html (October 2004). 
99 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), 106(5) 
100 17 U.S.C. § 106(3):  “to distribute copies or phonorecords to the work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership or by rental lease or lending.” This limitation has attracted almost no 
attention in the 30 years since the enactment of the 1976 Act, presumably because few 
unauthorized private distributions of copies or phonorecords have attracted litigation.   
 
101 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(1) 
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A number of other personal uses are permitted because of statutory 
exemptions and privileges.  The first sale doctrine in section 109 allows 
distribution and display to the public of owned, lawfully made copies and 
phonorecords. Section 109(e) permits the public performance of video games on 
coin-operated machines.  Section 110(5) allows people to listen to and watch 
radio and television broadcasts in public places, so long as they use the sort of 
equipment commonly found in private homes. Section 110(11) allows private 
households to use software to hide objectionable scenes in motion pictures they 
are viewing.102 Section 117 permits people to modify and make backup copies of 
the computer programs on their computers. Section 120 allows homeowners to 
renovate and photograph their homes, notwithstanding the architects’ 
reproduction and adaptation rights.  Section 602 permits people to import copies 
or phonorecords of copyrighted works for use (as distinguished from sale) as part 
of their personal luggage. Section 1008 prohibits copyright infringement suits 
against consumers who make noncommercial copies of recorded music (at least 
so long as they use analog or digital audio recording devices or media.)  
 
In addition, the statute includes specific exemptions for intermediaries to 
reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform or display works for the benefit of people 
making exempt personal uses. Section 110(11) allows software companies to 
create and market programs designed to assist individuals who wish to censor 
offensive scenes in motion picture broadcasts or DVDs.  Section 111 allows the 
proprietors of hotels and apartment buildings to transmit broadcast programs to 
individual apartments and hotel rooms so that the occupants can perform them 
privately. Section 117 permits computer repair services authorized by people who 
own computers to run the copyrighted computer programs installed on 
individuals’ machines as part of the repair process.  Section 121 allows non-profit 
groups to reproduce copyrighted books and magazines in a format that allows 
blind and disabled people to read or listen to them.  
 
Finally, some personal uses that qualify for no express statutory exemption 
have been held to be privileged by courts.  Sony v. Universal Studios classified 
home video-recording of broadcast television signals for time shifting purposes as 
fair use, and the manufacturer and sale of devices to accomplish it as non-
infringing.103 Recording Industry Association v. Diamond Multimedia held that 
the consumer copying of digital music recordings to a portable MP3 player was 
non-infringing personal use,104 and that the manufacture and sale of devices to 
facilitate it was not actionable. 
                                                
102 Family Movie Act of 2005,  Public L. No. 109-9, title II (2005), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 
110(11). 
103 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
104 RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F. 3d 1072, 1079 (1999). The court’s basis for this 
conclusion is ambiguous.  It isn’t clear whether the court intended to hold that such copying came 
within the shelter of 17 USC § 1008 or was excused on some other ground, such as fair use.  See 
A&M v. Napster, (9th Cir. 2001). In a recent Copyright Office filing, a coalition of copyright 
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Before moving into more controversial territory, let’s pause for reflection.  All 
of us make personal uses of copyrighted works that don’t seem to fall within any 
of the exclusions I outlined above.105  I back up my hard disk every week, even 
though I know that I am making archival copies of material that is not a computer 
program and therefore is not within the scope of the privilege in section 117.  
Indeed, chastened by the repeated meltdown of a shiny new iMac G5 two years 
ago, I back it up to three different locations.  My son collects comic books and 
manga, and practices drawing manga characters that look as much as possible like 
the drawings he uses as models.  My husband has purchased two computer 
programs that allow him to record, scan, manipulate, transpose, revise and 
generate sheet music or audio files for musical compositions.  He uses them on 
songs from Broadway musicals to create versions easy for our son to sing. My 
sister’s family has a Tivo.  They like it so much that they bought one as a birthday 
present for our mother.  My friend Ann cannot be discouraged from forwarding 
me email messages that she thinks I’ll enjoy.  My neighbor across the street has 
triplets to whom she frequently reads aloud.  Because of her firm ideas about 
what’s appropriate literature for her children, she commonly edits language, 
gender and important plot points as she reads, on the fly.   My neighbors down the 
block are college students who party loudly on summer weekends, playing their 
CDs through powerful speakers; if they open their windows, their sound of music 
reaches the entire neighborhood.   
 
The conventional analysis would tell us that when those uses involve a fixed 
reproduction, an adaptation, or a public distribution, performance or display, then 
they infringe copyright unless they are excused by the fair use privilege codified 
in section 107.  My hard disk backups, my son’s drawing, my mother’s TiVo and 
and my friend’s email messages all involve unauthorized fixed reproduction.  My 
neighbor’s reading aloud generates unauthorized adaptations.  My husband’s 
software permits him to do both.  My neighbors down the block are engaged in 
unauthorized public performance.   If the conventional analysis is right, then 
either our uses are fair under the multi-factor statutory test, or we are routinely 
breaking the law.   
 
The tools we have developed to evaluate a claim of fair use, though, seem ill-
fitted to assess the lawfulness of these or other common personal uses. The 
statute, as interpreted by the courts, would have us ask whether the purpose of use 
                                                                                                                                
owners insisted that such copying was lawful only to the extent that copyright owners had 
implicitly authorized it.  See U.S. Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention 
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control technologies, Docket Number RM 2005-11, 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/11metalitz_AAP.pdf (filed Feb. 2, 2006), at 22-23 & 
n.46. 
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is commercial or noncommercial, whether it is transformative or duplicative, 
whether the work we are using is primarily factual or occupies the core of 
protected copyrightable expression, whether we use a only a small part of the 
work or a large part, or even the entire thing, and whether our uses threaten to 
substitute for authorized, licensed uses in the marketplace.106   Whether the use is 
commercial seems as if it might be important, as does whether it usurps the 
market for or competes with the copyright owner’s exploitation.  The other fair 
use factors, though, don’t seem apposite.107  Two of the weightiest considerations 
in a conventional fair use analysis are whether the use is transformative and how 
much of the work is being used. Neither seems to illuminate whether a given 
personal use should be lawful.  Nor is the nature of the work being used likely to 
make a big difference.  We care about the nature of a work when we are asking 
whether it makes sense to allow someone to make the work available to the public 
in either transformed or unchanged form.  Where the use is personal, though, it’s 
hard to see how the nature of the work would matter.  If copyright law is designed 
to encourage the creation and dissemination of works of that nature, it should also 
welcome their consumption.   
 
Thus, if we analyze my multiple backups of my hard disk, it’s difficult to 
conclude that I am making a fair use unless we put a thumb on the scales.  The 
purpose of the use is duplicative and archival, something that cut against a finding 
of fair use in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco.108  Moreover, many of the 
files on my hard drive are files I use for projects, like my trademarks casebook,109 
that I pursue primarily for commercial gain.  The nature of the works that I copy 
is mixed, but at least some of the works are of the sort that courts locate at the 
core of copyright protection.  I have, for example, more than ten gigabytes of 
music on my hard drive.  All of it got there legitimately in the first instance, but 
that doesn’t give me the right to make three different copies of entire songs every 
week, nor to transmit one of those copies over the Internet to a remote location.  
Some of the files on my hard disk, such as early drafts of student papers and other 
people’s scholarship, further, are unpublished works.  Other files represent copies 
that infringe other people’s copyrights.  The amount of these works that I copy is 
entire works, and I copy them, in their entirety, many times.  Finally, we come to 
the effect of my promiscuous copying on the copyright owner’s potential market.  
                                                
106 17 U.S.C. § 107.  See, e.g.,  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F. 3d 881 (1994). 
107 Indeed, it’s interesting that Sony, the sole Supreme Court case to try to assess personal use 
under the fair use rubric, was widely criticized for its analysis of the fair use factors, and 
particularly for giving only nominal consideration to factors other than whether the use was 
commercial and whether it was likely to harm the copyright owner’s market.  See, e.g., Lloyd 
Weinreb, Fair’s Fair, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1137, 1153; Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and 
Legislative History, 72 Cornell. L. Rev. 857,  897-898 (1987); sources cited in Litman, supra note 
19, at 350n.11. 
108 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995). 
109 Jane C. Ginsburg, Jessica Litman, and Mary L. Kevlin, Trademarks and Unfair Competition:  
Cases and Materials (3d ed. 2001 & 2006 Supp.). 
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There is currently no market for licensing backup copies.  Copyright owners’ 
release of copy-protected copies of their works that permit purchasers to make a 
small number of copies, however, suggest that such a market may be beginning to 
emerge.  If I, and people like me, may make multiple archival copies without a 
license, then that nascent market could be damaged.110   
 
Less fancifully, consider my sister’s Tivo.  Let’s imagine that she sets it to 
copy every first-run episode of ABC’s hit series, Lost, which airs in her 
community at a time when she is otherwise occupied.  The purpose of her copying 
is duplicative rather than transformative.  She’s motivated solely by 
considerations of convenience.  The nature of the work is highly creative, and 
subject to copyright’s strongest protection. She’s copying entire programs, and 
her copies allow her to avoid paying $1.99 per episode for downloadable copies 
through the friendly neighborhood Apple iTunes online music store.111  That last 
fact has been enough in some cases to persuade a court to characterize a use as 
commercial, since one is getting for free something one would otherwise have to 
pay for.112   
 
My sister doesn’t do a lot of business travel, but my mother does.  Let’s 
imagine that, next year, one of mom’s tech-savvy children buys her a Slingbox113   
to hook up to that Tivo she got from my sister.  A Slingbox is a small and clever 
electronic device that connects to the source of one’s television signal and to 
one’s home network.  The Slingbox will then allow one to “place shift” one’s 
television signal. That is, the Slingbox-equipped are able to watch whatever is 
currently playing on their home televisions on  remote computers over the 
Internet.  My mother isn’t much for Lost, but she likes to watch games being 
played by her local Pittsburgh sports teams, and she likes to watch them live.  She 
subscribes to whatever tier of cable service allows her to see all of the Pittsburgh 
sporting events.  Last winter, she came to visit us in Michigan.  As delightful as 
she found our company, she was upset to be missing a University of Pittsburgh 
basketball game that was going on at the time but not being broadcast nationally.  
If she had just stayed home, she could have watched the game.  If she had had a 
Slingbox, though, she could have visited us and watched the game.  Any of her 
children could buy one at the local Circuit City and hook it up for her, but would 
using it be legal?  The Slingbox makes no copies, unless you count RAM copies, 
                                                
110 Cf. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F. 3d 881 (1994)(finding copying of scientific 
articles for researcher unfair in part because it might undermine nascent market for photocopy 
licenses). 
111 See Apple -  iTunes – Videos at URL: <http://www.apple.com/itunes/videos/>. 
112 See, e.g., A&M v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896  (C. D. Cal. 2000) (“Moreover, the fact that 
Napster users get for free something they would ordinarily have to buy suggests that they reap 
economic advantages from Napster use”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
113 See http://www.slingmedia.com. 
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but many courts do.114  It also is transmitting a television signal over the Internet, 
in what may not be a private (and therefore exempt) performance.  If we have to 
apply the fair use factors to allow her to view material she has subscribed to and 
paid for in my home rather than her own, her chances don’t look too good.  
Mom’s purpose is consumptive rather than transformative. The material she’s 
copying and transmitting, at least in this instance, is a televised sporting event.  
While sportscasts don’t reflect the sort of authorship that we think of as at the 
core of copyright, they are among the most valuable broadcasts that copyright 
protects.  She’s copying and transmitting entire programs, and her doing so 
undercuts the market for online and mobile phone products that the copyright 
owner targets to viewers like her.115   
 
We could rerun the four-factor fair use analysis on all of the personal uses 
I described earlier.  The conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that some 
personal uses are and should be legal, others aren’t and shouldn’t be, and the rest 
occupy a murky middle ground.  The statutory fair use test, though, is remarkably 
unhelpful in identifying which uses are, or should be, legal. 
 
 The inaptness of the fair use factors shouldn’t surprise us.  They derive 
from an era when copyright covered only the rights to print, reprint, publish and 
vend, and most personal uses required no excuse to be lawful.116 When seeking 
language in which to codify the fair use privilege, the drafters of the 1976 
Copyright Act looked back to Folsom v. Marsh, an 1841 case involving an 
allegedly infringing biography of George Washington.117 The application of the 
fair use privilege to personal use received almost no attention during the 25 year 
process that led to the enactment of the 1976 Act.118  When the topic came up, 
witnesses invariably pointed out that reported fair use decisions involved public, 
commercial uses.119  Although witnesses disagreed then, as they undoubtedly 
would now, as to whether the paucity of judicial decisions on the lawfulness of 
personal use derived from the legitimacy of the uses or the litigation costs that 
                                                
114 See, e.g., MAI v. Peake. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).    For a discussion of why reproductions 
in RAM should not be deemed “copies” under the copyright statute, see Pamela Samuelson, The 
Copyright Grab, Wired, Jan. 1996, at 134; Joseph Liu, Owning Digital Copies:  Copyright Law 
and the Incidents of  Copy Ownership, 42 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 1245. 1255-78 (2001). 
115 See http://msn.foxsports.com (visited Aug. 25, 2006). 
116 See R. Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v Marsh:  Distinguishing Between Infringing and 
Legitimate Uses, in JANE C. GINSBURG & ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW STORIES 253, 286-88 (forthcoming 2005); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and 
Market Failure:  Sony Revisited,  82 B.U. L. Rev.  975, 997-98 (2002). 
117 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed Cas. 342 (CCD Ma 1841). 
118 See Litman, supra note 19, at __. 
119 See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell. L. Rev. 857, 
883-88, 897-898 (1987). 
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might make suits against individuals unappetizing,120 it seems clear that fair use 
cases, then as now, have overwhelming concerned uses that were public, 
commercial, or both.  For that reason, the fair use factors are designed to address 
whether and when it is appropriate to make a public and often commercial use 
without permission.  They were not devised to evaluate the legitimacy of personal 
uses. 
 
 Fair use is a poor tool for assessing the lawfulness of particular personal 
uses for another reason:  it is not realistically available to the people who most 
need to use it.  Fair use in its current form is notoriously fact-specific, requiring a 
hideously expensive trial on the merits to determine.121  If a person seeking to 
determine whether a given personal use is lawful needs to go to court, each time, 
to find out, then the tool is of almost no practical assistance. 
   
 To recap, there is a zone of personal use that is uncontroversially non-
infringing.  That zone includes personal uses that are outside the scope of 
copyright law, uses that come within express statutory exemptions and privileges, 
and uses that have been found non-infringing by courts.  The zone also includes a 
bunch of other uses.  Conventional analysis dictates that those other uses are 
either infringing or fair use under section 107.  If personal uses like the ones I’ve 
listed can be described as “infringing,” though, they are infringing only in the 
most nominal sense.  If some copyright owner sued me, my family, my friend or 
my neighbor over those uses, the copyright owner would lose.  Copyright lawyers 
may disagree about on what theory the copyright owner should lose, but not about 
the ultimate result.122  If that means that all of the personal uses must be fair use, 
though, then that is possible only by construing fair use to cover any use that is 
nominally but not enforceably infringing, regardless of its purpose, the work’s 
nature, the amount taken and the effect on the market.  The minute we insist on 
applying fair use responsibly, the situation becomes even more unstable.  My 
neighbor’s censored read-alouds are perhaps transformative; my hard disk 
backups are, on the other hand, profoundly duplicative.   
 
 If fair use analysis doesn’t resolve the lawfulness of personal use, then the 
conventional story is misleading, at best.   It is also, potentially, a dangerous 
story, because it invites us to conclude that lawful personal uses that don’t fit the 
fair use rubric may be legal, but they shouldn’t be.  Rather, we can see them as 
unprincipled exceptions that should not be allowed to spread. We are in danger of 
obliterating lawful personal use because we’ve been pretending that it isn’t there.  
 
                                                
120 See 1965 House Hearings before Subcomm # 3 at 1498-99 (Statement of Ralph H Dwan, on 
behalf of 3M);  id. at 1514-16 (Statement of Lyle Lodwick, Williams & Wilkins). 
121 See Mark Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights in the Internet, 22 Dayton L. Rev. 
(1997); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image, 22 Dayton L. Rev. 
587,  611-13 (1997) 
122 Cf. Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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VI.  A geography of personal use 
….I say to you that the VCR is to the American film 
producer and the American public as the Boston 
strangler is to the woman home alone. 
--Jack Valenti, 1982123  
 
 The fair use factors seem like a clumsy and unhelpful test for ascertaining 
whether a particular personal use is lawful.  If personal use has value in the 
copyright system because it facilitates reading, listening, viewing and playing, 
moreover, evaluating personal uses under the fair use test is likely to cause us to 
miss important distinctions between personal uses we should encourage and 
personal uses that we should be eager to prohibit.   It also makes it easy to mistake 
the degree to which current law permits or prohibits specific activity.  Mapping 
out the contours of lawful personal use is, thus, useful for two reasons.  First, we 
will be better able to assess whether the encroachment on personal use is a good 
thing or a bad one if we have a more accurate picture of what is legal and illegal 
today.  Second, any normative proposals on how we ought to treat personal use 
will be more effective if they start with a more truthful picture of current law. 
 
If the analysis derived from section 107 is not helpful in assessing the 
lawfulness of particular personal uses, can we derive a better test?  Our starting 
point should be the recognition that copyright law is intended to encourage 
reading as well as writing.  We can appropriate some useful insights from older 
cases that sought to parse the statute to advance both.  Those courts focused on 
two questions.  First, some courts asked, is the allegedly infringing use more akin 
to exploiting the copyrighted work or enjoying it? Second, some courts sought to 
evaluate the impact of the accused activity on individuals’ opportunities to read, 
listen and view as well as on authors and publishers’ incentives to write, compose,  
publish and perform.  I suggest that when we look at the lawfulness of personal 
uses, we need to ask both of those questions.  We need to situate particular 
personal uses on the continuum between exploitation and enjoyment.  We also 
need to evaluate both their potential to undermine core copyright incentives and 
their potential to enhance essential copyright liberties of reading, viewing, 
listening and their kin.  Asking these questions may yield a test that echoes the 
familiar fair use test, or one that differs in significant respects from the test in 
section 107.  Since fair use is a poor device for evaluating personal uses, it makes 
sense to design a more appropriate tool first, and then ascertain whether fair use 
can be tweaked to do a better job or whether we need a completely different test.   
                                                
123 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works Works:  Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794 H.R. 4808, 
H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 before The Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and The 
Administration Of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) (testimony of 
Jack Valenti, MPAA) 
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A. The continuum between exploitation and enjoyment 
   
Once upon a time, disseminating works of authorship entailed significant 
capital investment, and discerning the difference between publishers and readers, 
record labels and listeners was difficult only at the margins, where intermediaries 
sought to facilitate the reading or listening experience without a license.124  The 
rapid growth of networked digital technology, though, has put cheap mass 
dissemination within the reach of  individuals.125  At the same time, consumers 
have access to software tools that permit them to alter and combine copies of 
copyrighted works in ways that until recently were reserved to commercial 
businesses.126 Individuals’ new abilities to engage in acts once the exclusive 
province of publishers, record labels, film studios, and television broadcasters 
have blurred the line between conventional exploitation of works of authorship 
and digitally enhanced enjoyment.    
 
If we are grounding the analysis of lawfulness in part on the extent to 
which a personal use  is best understood as reading, listening, or one of their 
cousins, then we need to reflect on what sorts of reading, listening, looking at, 
using, running, playing and building copyright seeks to encourage.  How broadly 
does copyright need its liberties to be drawn?    We want people to be able to 
interact with texts as well as absorb them.  Clapping hands, humming along, or 
playing a song on the piano all, technically, create unlicensed derivative works, as 
do reading aloud, playacting, and imagining a story’s ending differently.  They 
are nonetheless lawful by long tradition; they’re precisely the sorts of interaction 
with copyrighted works that  promote the Progress of Science. Nor does it make 
any copyright sense to limit readers, listeners and lookers to the reading and 
listening behaviors that were customary in 1790.  Just as technology spurs 
evolution in the creation and marketing of works of authorship, it  causes parallel 
evolution in the modes of interaction with those  works.  We don’t want to restrict  
copyright owners to the traditional marketing outlets of bookstore and sheet music 
sales.  Similarly, it makes no sense to limit readers, listeners, and players to 
pianos or analog cassette tapes. 
 
If the distinction between reading, listening and viewing on one hand and 
publishing, distributing and broadcasting on the other is more of a continuum, can 
we even draw a useful distinction between enjoyment and exploitation?  There 
will be difficult cases at the margin, but most personal uses, which I defined 
earlier as uses made by individuals for themselves, their families, or their close 
friends, will fall on the enjoyment side of the line.  That, without more, does not 
mean that we should presume them to be lawful.  It does, however, suggest that 
                                                
124 See Sony; Teleprompter;  
125 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); Litman, supra note 39. 
126 See Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit, Symposium:  Cultural Environmentalism @ 10, __ L. 
& Contemp. Probs. __ (forthcoming 2006). 
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we deem them unlawful only at some cost to the fabric and purposes of copyright 
law.  We should think carefully about whether the impact of such uses on core 
copyright owner incentives is sufficiently substantial to be worth chipping away 




B. The impact of the use on copyright incentives and liberties 
 
In order to evaluate whether particular personal uses should, as a 
normative matter, be lawful, it is useful to look at the likely effects of the use on 
copyright incentives, and the degree the use is likely to enhance what I have 
called historic copyright liberties.  Some personal uses will significantly 
undermine copyright incentives without enhancing reading, viewing or listening.  
Those uses, it seems to me, are uses we should feel comfortable in deeming 
infringing.  Some uses will pose little threat to copyright incentives while greatly 
enhancing copyright liberties, and those uses should almost always be deemed 
legal, whether they line up with conventional fair use analysis or not.   Personal 
uses that neither contribute to the exercise of copyright liberties nor undermine 
core copyright incentives are more problematic to classify, but little turns on 
whether we get the answer wrong.  Uses that both enhance reading, listening, 
using, running and playing, and also threaten to significantly undermine copyright 
incentives are, and should be, the most difficult uses to resolve, and may require 
sensitive and careful balancing.  In works and markets for which copyright owner 
incentives are abundant, the core purposes of copyright should counsel permitting 
uses that advance copyright liberties. 
 
The only doctrinal tool in copyright law for evaluating the plausible 
impact of a use on copyright incentives is the fair use test, which is problematic in 
this context for all of the reasons I discussed in the last section.  Some of the 
questions the fair use test addresses are nonetheless useful questions to ask in 
connection with the lawfulness of personal uses. 
 
Of the fair use factors, the one that seems most salient in evaluating 
personal uses is whether that use is commercial.  There seems to be a strong social 
consensus in the United States that copyright owners should be able to control the 
commercial exploitation of their works.127 The commercial nature of a use seems 
to capture something important about the public’s impression of the nature of the 
copyright bargain.  If a use is intended for commercial gain, it seems reasonable 
to share some portion of that gain with the copyright owner; moreover, if a use 
involves commercial exploitation of a work, it seems more likely to collide with 
the copyright owner’s exploitation.  Thus, a commercial use is more likely than a 
                                                
127 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COPYRIGHT AND HOME COPYING:  TECHNOLOGY 
CHALLENGES THE LAW 145-47, 163-65 (1989); The Policy Planning Group, Yankelovich, Skelly 
& White, Inc., Public Perceptions of the "Intellectual Property Rights" Issue (1985) (OTA 
Contractor Report). 
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non-commercial one to interfere with the incentives promised by the copyright 
act. Recent analyses of the commercial nature of personal uses, however, have 
seen unprincipled expansion of the meaning of the term.128  In A&M v. Napster, 
for example, the 9th Circuit held that people who used the Napster file sharing 
software made commercial use of copyrighted works because “repeated and 
exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works were made to save the 
expense of purchasing authorized copies.” 129  In Arista Records v. 
MP3Board.com, the court concluded that individuals who used an Internet search 
engine to find online sources for music files were making commercial use of the 
files they searched for because they “profit[ed] from the exploitation of the 
copyrighted work without paying the customary prices." 130  If any use that allows 
a person to get for free something she would otherwise need to pay for is a 
commercial one, though, then most lawful unlicensed uses would be commercial. 
Defining commercial use so broadly makes it useless as a sorting tool.  In order to 
help us distinguish permissible from impermissible uses, we need to define 
commercial use narrowly enough to capture direct financial gain and exclude 
more indirect benefit. 
 
What seems to have distracted courts131 in the online context into a violent 
expansion of the meaning of commercial is the perception that multiple, 
individual noncommercial online uses can combine to make something that seems 
commercial in scale and threatens to undermine copyright owners’ opportunities 
to exploit their works commercially. In the context of a fair use inquiry, though, 
that observation implicates the fourth fair use factor, which asks what effect the 
use might have on the effect on the market for the copyrighted work.  Using it to 
transform noncommercial personal uses into commercial ones under the first fair 
use factor and then noting its effect on the market in considering the fourth factor 
is double-counting.   
 
Whether a use might compete with uses licensed by the copyright owner is 
a factor that has been important to a number of courts in evaluating the lawfulness 
                                                
128 See Michael Meurer, Too Many Markets or Too Few?  Copyright Policy Towards Shared 
Works, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903, 952 (2004); John Tehranian, Et Tu Fair Use?  The Triumph of 
Natural Law Copyright, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 465, 502-03 (2005).  
129 A&M v. Napster, 239 F. 3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).  See also A&M v. Napster, 114 F. 
Supp. 2d 896  (C. D. Cal. 2000) (“Moreover, the fact that Napster users get for free something 
they would ordinarily have to buy suggests that they reap economic advantages from Napster 
use”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
130 Arista Records v. MP3Board.com, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165; Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) 
P28,483 (SDNY 2002) (quoting Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 562). 
131 Arguably, Congress is guilty of something analogous in connection with criminal copyright 
infringement.  See No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147 (1995), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 
506 and 18 U.S.C. § 2319.  See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr,  Defining Overcriminalization 
through Cost-Benefit Analysis:  The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws.  54 Am. U. L. Rev. 
783 (2005).  
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of personal uses.132  That’s appropriate:  a use that competes with a copyright 
owner’s program of exploitation has the potential to undermine the copyright 
owners’ incentives significantly.  At the same time, we don’t want to presume that 
every time a copyright owner devises a new license, that fact without more 
transforms historical lawful uses into unlawful ones.  Apple’s iTunes store’s sale 
of downloadable Desperate Housewives episodes did not make the users of 
videocassette recorders into infringers, nor should it have.  We need to give the 
analysis of competitive uses more serious attention than simply accepting 
assertions that any time a person gets for free something that she might otherwise 
buy, she has damaged the copyright owner’s market by displacing a sale. As Glyn 
Lunney has pointed out, we’ve assumed the unlawfulness of much personal use 
without trial or rigorous analysis, because we’ve been too ready to equate free 
goods with displaced sales.133 
 
Unless we assume that the optimum incentive for copyright owners is 
boundless, the fact that a use of a work could be monetized if making it without a 
license were made illegal shouldn’t without more persuade us that we need to 
give the use into copyright owners’ control.  On the other hand, where a personal 
use competes with commercial uses at the heart of the copyright owner’s 
exploitation of its works, the use’s potential to undermine important copyright 
incentives should be a cause for concern. 
 
The commercial and potentially competitive nature of specific personal 
uses seem relevant to an assessment of the use’s likely effects on copyright 
incentives.  Neither aspect, though, tells us much about the use’s potential to 
enhance copyright liberties.  In order to compare the use’s impact on copyright, 
we need to look at other considerations. 
 
Some of these considerations are intuitively as appealing as the 
commercial or competitive nature of the use.  For example, one important 
question is whether the specific use is private.  The statute expressly exempts 
private distributions, performances and displays, but not private copies or 
adaptations.  The same considerations that have so far discouraged Congress from 
making private distributions, performances and displays actionable often 
accompany private copies and adaptations.  So long as a person’s use is private, 
its impact on the copyright owner’s exploitation of her work is likely to be 
limited, while its contribution to the person’s reading, listening or viewing may be 
significant.   
 
                                                
132 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at __. 
133 See Lunney, supra note 28, at __. See also American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 
F.3d 913, 936-39 (1994)(Jacobs, J, dissenting); Sam Hughes, The Piracy Calculator, at URL: 
http://qntm.org/owe (“What's your illegal hoard worth? What's the street value of all your pirated 
MP3s and movies? How much would the RI/MPAA demand - minimum - if they sued you? Find 
out.”). 
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In addition, permitting private uses advances important copyright and non-
copyright interests.  Julie Cohen has written several articles exploring the idea of 
“intellectual privacy.”134 Intellectual privacy advances liberty by giving us 
freedom to think without surveillance, and is a crucial aspect of any liberty worth 
having.  The ability to read works without surveillance may, for some works and 
some readers, be key to being able to read them at all.135 
 
Another consideration that is intuitively appealing is whether the use is 
incidental to some other use, and, if so, whether that primary use is permissible, 
either because it is exempt or because it is licensed. Incidental uses occupy the 
core of the sort of personal use that copyright law should encourage.  If one 
purpose of copyright law is to encourage creation and dissemination of works of 
authorship, and another goal is to advance reading, listening, viewing and playing 
of those works, uses that facilitate authorized reading, listening and viewing have 
a very strong claim for copyright’s solicitude.  Because incidental uses are 
secondary to uses that are either excluded from the copyright owner’s bundle of 
rights or already otherwise licensed, they pose little threat of undermining 
copyright incentives. 
 
 For much of copyright law’s history, it was conventional to treat many 
incidental uses as impliedly licensed.136  Music publishers first exploited their 
public performance right by licensing public performance with the sale of copies.  
The initial justification for what became the jukebox exemption was that the 
public performance of music on coin-operated devices was purely promotional, 
for the purpose of selling copies of sheet music.137 Radio and later television 
broadcasters commonly made temporary copies of licensed material to facilitate 
broadcasts, on the assumption that such copies were within the scope of the 
license.138  
 
 In the digital realm, the results have been different.  When MP3.com 
purchased and copied CDs to facilitate licensed streaming of the musical works 
                                                
134 See Julie E. Cohen, DRM & Privacy, ; Julie E. Cohen, Comment:  Copyright’s Public-Private 
Distinction, 55 Case Western L. Rev. 963 (2005); Cohen supra note 22. 
135 Professor Jonathan Cohen suggested that some individual music downloading bears more 
resemblance to a 21st century version of humming than to swiping CDs from a music store.  Until 
recently, if you heard a catchy song somewhere and couldn’t get the tune out of your head, or 
wanted to remind yourself of the melody, your best bet was to hum it.  Today, many people satisfy 
the same impulse by downloading the song in order to hear it again. 
136 See David Nimmer, Brains And Other Paraphernalia Of The Digital Age, 10 
Harv. J. Law & Tec 1 (1996). 
137 See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT L. J. 337 (2002). 
138 See Copyright Law Revision Part 6:  Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on 
the General Revision of the US Copyright Law:  1965 Revision Bill 44-47(1965).  Congress later 
incorporated an express ephemeral recording privilege for licensed broadcasters in the 1976 
Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 112.   
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recorded on them, it was held liable for willful infringement.139  MP3.com argued 
that its purchase of a performing rights license carried with it an implied license to 
reproduce the works insofar as necessary to perform them.  The court disagreed. 
MP3.com’s licensors had no authority to grant an implied reproduction license, 
and therefore could not have done so: 
 
Performance" and "reproduction" are clearly and 
unambiguously separate rights under the Copyright Act 
of 1976. Here, the performing rights licenses themselves, 
as their name implies, explicitly authorize public 
performance only, do not purport to grant a reproduction 
right in musical compositions, and, in at least one case, 
expressly disclaim such a grant.  Moreover, the 
performing rights societies themselves do not, and do 
not purport to have, the authority to grant such a right.140  
 
 More generally, a person licensed to make a licensed use of a copyrighted 
work can no longer rely on that license to make other uses that are incidental to or 
necessary for the use covered by the license.  Since copyrights are infinitely 
divisible, and rights are commonly divided and separately controlled, there’s no 
reason to think that the licensor of the licensed right has the authority to license 
the incidental use, impliedly or otherwise. 
 
The chaos wrought by divisible copyright is impeding licensing of online 
content even for businesses well-supplied with copyright lawyers.141  While 
courts might once have inferred permission for activity incidental to a licensed 
use, they now face the obstacle that the owner of the licensed right may not own 
the right to authorize the incidental use.  Exacerbating the problem is the 
copyright fashion to claim that any digital use of a work necessarily implicates 
multiple distinct copyright rights, each of which may be separately owned.142  The 
need to secure several licenses for a single use of any given work has stymied 
efforts to launch licensed online businesses and driven unlicensed start-ups into 
bankruptcy.  Negotiations to amend the copyright law to solve this set of 
                                                
139 See Country Road Music v. MP3.com, 209 F. Supp. 2d 325 (SDNY 2003) 
140 Id. at 327-28 (footnotes omitted). Similar considerations seemed to be at work in the 
Fortnightly and Sony decisions, discussed earlier. In both cases, the Court emphasized that 
defendant merely facilitated consumers’ watching programming that they were entitled to view.  
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1968); Sony v. Universal 
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See also Teleprompter v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).  
 
141 See generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 Case Western 
Reserve L. Rev. 673 (2003); Music Licensing Reform:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Intellecutla Property of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 12, 2005) 
(statement of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). 
142 See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 37 Hastings Comm/Ent 1 (2004); Loren, supra note 
141. 
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problems, though, have stalled as competing copyright owners try to ensure they 
get the largest slices of pie.143 
 
 We can leave them to sort it out among themselves.  For the purposes of 
personal use, we should avail ourselves of a simplifying solution.  Since treating 
copyrights as if they were plots of real estate, subject to subdivision and separate 
exploitation, has caused the problem, we can look to basic property law for its 
way out of the problem.  The property law solution to this sort of mess is the 
easement by implication.  If Abel carves Blackacre up into teeny tiny plots so that 
Baker can build a mess of ticky tacky houses, but draws the lines so that half the 
houses have no access to the road, the law implies an easement to enable the 
purchasers of the remote lots to reach the highway, because road access is a 
necessary incident to enjoyment of the land ownership.  Without road access, how 
could purchasers move into their ticky tacky houses?  Copyrights are unitary 
before they are divided.  If the author or her assignee chooses to convey the 
reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, public performance and public 
display rights to separate entities, it makes sense to presume that she conveys with 
each distinct exclusive right the power to engage in uses incidental to that right, 
even if they implicate other exclusive rights. 
 
 In particular, we should deem non-infringing any personal uses that are 
merely incidental to the exercise of historic copyright liberties to read, listen, or 
look at.  Thus, even if one concurs with the line of cases that holds that any 
appearance of a work in a computer’s random access memory is a fixed and 
therefore infringing reproduction,144 RAM copies made in the course of reading 
an ebook, watching a DVD, or listening to a CD should not infringe, whether or 
not the copies come within an express exemption in sections 107, 117 or 1008.   
 
The lawfulness of personal uses 
 
When we analyze the lawfulness of personal uses, we should pay attention to 
the extent to which they advance essential copyright liberties of reading listening, 
and viewing, as well as the extent to which they undermine copyright incentives.  
I suggest that the degree to which personal uses are commercial, competitive, 
private, or incidental to other lawful uses reveals their tendency to do both of 
these things.   
 
Analyzing personal use using this rubric is not necessarily going to lead us to 
consensus. I suspect, for example, that when Mitch Bainwol explains that the 
                                                
143 Mary Beth Peters, Register of Copyrights,  State of the Union,  Future of Music Coalition 5th 
Annual Policy Summit,  Sept. 12, 2005, podcast online at URL: 
<http://www.futureofmusic.org/events/summit05/panel04.cfm>. 
144 See MAI Systems v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Storage Tech. Corp. v. 
Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, 421 F.3d 1307 (fed Cir 2005); Triad Systems v. 
Southeastern Express, 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995);  Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse 
Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999); sources cited supra note 114. 
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recording industry has no problem with personal use, he is talking about a narrow 
subset of the personal uses that are non-commercial, non-competitive, private and 
incidental.  I would personally argue in favor of  a regime permitting all incidental 
personal uses, all private personal uses and, in addition, any personal use that is 
both noncommercial and noncompetitive.145  Looking at these considerations 
rather than the familiar fair use ones, however, at least enables us to argue about 





VII.  “All rights reserved” 
 
The copyright statutes ought to be reasonably construed with a view to 
effecting the purposes intended by Congress. They ought not to be 
unduly extended by judicial construction to include privileges not 
intended to be conferred, nor so narrowly construed as to deprive those 
entitled to their benefit of the rights Congress intended to grant. 
-- Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 , 346 (1908) 
 
 
 In Sony v. Universal Studios, Justice Blackmun argued in his memoranda 
to the other Justices that the 1976 Copyright Act gave copyright owners the 
exclusive right to reproduce their works and that any reproduction not otherwise 
permitted by an explicit statutory exemption was therefore infringing.  Justice 
Blackmun looked at the history of Supreme Court cases interpreting the scope of 
copyright narrowly, and argued that Congress had intended, in enacting the 1976 
Act, to dissuade courts from constrained readings of copyright rights.  There were 
no implicit copyright privileges or exemptions, Justice Blackmun argued, which 
meant that unauthorized uses that did not fall within an express statutory 
provision were unlawful unless they were fair use.  Fair use, futher, was a narrow 
privilege limited to productive uses; as a general matter, copyright owners should 
                                                
145 Applying this analysis, I would class peer-to-peer file sharing as non-commercial, competitive, 
non-private, and incidental to lawful private performance.  On that basis, I would allow it.  
Someone who insisted on all factors cutting in the personal user’s direction  would prohibit it.  
Peer to peer file sharing is in fact a more complex case, since one should probably divide it into 
downloading music and what has been called “uploading” music.  Downloading music, as well as 
being non-commercial and incidental, is also quite plausibly characterized as private, which 
strengthens its argument to be deemed lawful.  “Uploading” music is not even remotely private, 
but it may be non-infringing nonetheless, since it seems to involving neither copying nor 
distribution of copies on the “uploader’s” part.   Nobody has yet been able to persuade me that the 
act of having a copy of a file in a location accessible to the public should be deemed distribution 
simply because it can have the same result as distribution.  Courts, however, have been more 
receptive to the argument.  See, e.g., A&M v. Napster, 239 F. 3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001).    But 
see UMG Recordings v. Hummer-Winblad, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796  (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
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not be forced to subsidize ordinary uses.146  Justice Blackmun lost that argument 
and went on to write the dissent in Sony.  Copyright scholars, however, have by 
and large adopted Justice Blackmun’s analysis of the meaning and structure of the 
1976 Act.  The statute is so long and so detailed that we deny the existence of  
implied privileges or exemptions.147  Any reproduction or adaptation, any public 
distribution, performance or display is a prima facie infringement unless it is 
covered by a specific exemption or limitation or privileged by fair use.148 
 
 That’s not true, of course, unless one believes in a generous and expansive 
version of fair use that it would be hard to find in any recent judicial opinions.    
We all routinely engage in activity that would be unlawful under such an 
understanding.  We back up our hard disks; we forward emails to friends.  We 
read aloud to our children using funny voices for different characters; we play 
CDs on our car stereos with our windows open. 
 
 What does that matter, given that nobody is likely to file suit over personal 
uses?  The recent lawsuits against thousands of individuals caught using peer-to-
peer file trading software might warn against relying too much on the seeming 
unthinkability of individual lawsuits over personal use.  Assuming, however, that 
personal use lawsuits are hugely unlikely, what harm does it do to frame the 
statutory interpretation question that way?149 
 
 One significant harm that flows from conceptualizing the statute in that 
way is that, if it’s inaccurate, it warps our thinking.  It encourages copyright 
owners to expect too much, and copyright scholars to demand too little.  It 
snookers judges into reinterpreting the language of the statute to give effect to the 
perceived intent of Congress, expanding copies to include RAM copies,150 and 
commercial uses to include any use a copyright owner might otherwise charge 
for.151  It shortchanges the readers, listeners, viewers, watchers, players and 
builders at the heart of the copyright system.   
 
 Nothing in the legislative history of the 1976 Act suggests that members 
of Congress intended to transform copyright from a grant of limited exclusive 
rights into an expansive monopoly over all uses of copyrighted works.  As 
recently as ten years ago, a suggestion that a literal reading of the statute in light 
of recent cases might give copyright owners control over reading, listening and 
                                                
146 See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 Case Western L. Rev. 917 (2005). 
147 See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change,  68 Oregon L. Rev. 275 
(1989). 
148 See, e.g., SHELDON HALPERN, DAVID E. SHIPLEY, & HOWARD B. ABRAMS, COPRIGHT:  CASES 
AND MATERIALS  201 (1992) 
149 See Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001). 
150 See MAI Systems v. Peake Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
151 See A&M v. Napster. 
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other personal uses seemed outlandish.  Today, it increasingly seems to be 
inevitable, even though the underlying statutory language hasn’t changed.  Part of 
the blame belongs at our own doors.  When scholars insisted that uses are 
unlawful unless expressly exempted, lawyers and courts may have believed us; 
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